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Conservation means the wise use of the earth . . . for the
greatest good of the greatest number for the longest time.1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Try to imagine a world where people do not have to see or experience the consequences of their actions for immense lengths of
time. A world where children can eat candy and treats with every
meal, and adults can live frivolously, consuming resources as if
there were no tomorrow—a world where everyone has access to
electricity and can thrive without a care. A time where everyone
could turn a blind eye to the costs and wastes that accumulate because of their lifestyles and live with blissful ignorance to the inevitable problems or issues that are somewhere around the bend.
While this world may seem foreign, in many ways it reflects a
reality people throughout the world face. With environmental issues on the rise throughout the world, along with the vast environmental revolution this country has experienced, it is imperative
that society continues to progress forward rather than turning a
blind eye to the consequences of our actions, such as accumulating
nuclear reactor wastes or greenhouse gas emissions.2

2. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste, http://www.gao.gov/key_issues/disposal_of_highlevel_nuclear_waste/issue_summary (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); see generally ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Climate Change Science
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From rivers catching on fire to killer smog events,3 this country has witnessed catastrophic disasters resulting from society’s
actions. Despite these disastrous experiences, this country has
taken steps forward assuring that these disasters will not happen
again.4 Learning from these environmental adversities, Congress
enacted legislation to adequately protect the environment, Americans’ health, and general welfare.5 By choosing to take action, rather than remaining complacent and continuing to live in ignorant
bliss, this country can continue moving forward in a more sustainable direction that ensures good health for both people and the environment.
With climate change becoming a growing and complex issue,
with the potential to initiate catastrophic disasters, governments
and leaders from all over the world are acknowledging and addressing it as the existential problem threatening our existence.6
Therefore, it is no surprise that the government here in the United
States is taking action to combat it. The Obama Administration
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) took drastic action to propel this country’s efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emis-

Overview, EPA http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/science/overview.html (last updated Nov.
4, 2015) (on June 22, 1969, the Cuyahoga River caught fire and ignited the desire and need to
get the Clean Water Act passed).
3. See generally Jennifer Latson, The Burning River That Sparked a Revolution,
TIME (June 22, 2015), http://time.com/3921976/cuyahoga-fire/; see generally Jen Carlson,
Flashback: The City’s Killer Smog, GOTHAMIST (Nov. 24, 2009), http://gothamist.com/2009/11/24/smog.php#photo-1 (within eleven years, starting in November of 1953,
smog killed between 539 and 629 people in New York City).
4. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1274 (2015) [hereinafter Clean Water Act]
(amended, became known as Clean Water Act in 1972); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (2015) [hereinafter Clean Air Act] (Clean Air Act, enacted 1970).
5. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, supra note 4; Clean Water Act, supra note 4; 7 U.S.C. §
136 (2015) (Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370m-12 (2015)
(National Environmental Policy Act).
6. See Kurt Cobb, Climate Change is Our Grand Narrative Now, RESOURCE
INSIGHTS (Nov. 29, 2015), http://resourceinsights.blogspot.com/2015/11/climate-is-our-grandnarrative-now.html;
see
also
COP21,
Find
Out
More
About
COP21,
http://www.cop21paris.org/about/cop21 (last visited Feb. 2, 2016).
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sions by focusing on potential reductions of carbon dioxide emissions.7 In doing so, the executive branch chose to focus chiefly on
the electric power sector within the energy sector.8 This is primarily because the electric power sector emits the most carbon dioxide
emissions, in comparison to the transportation, industry, residential, commercial, and agricultural sectors.9
The Clean Power Plan (“the Plan”) was published in the Federal Register on October 22, 2015, initiating a wave of lawsuits
fueled by state opposition to the Plan.10 The majority of states are
outraged by the new regulation.11 The opposing states specifically
and primarily argue that the Plan infringes upon their sovereign

7. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg.
64, 510 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Standards of Performance]; see also EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE
PRESIDENT,
THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN
(June
2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.
8. See Presidential Memorandum -- Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards to
the Environmental Protection Agency (June 25, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-sector-carbon-pollution-standards.
9. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Learn About Carbon Pollution From Power Plants,
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/learn-about-carbon-pollution-power-plants (last updated July 27, 2016).
10. See Standards of Performance, supra note 7; see also E&E PUBL’G, LLC, The Fate
of the Obama Administration’s Signature Climate Change Rule is in the Hands of the Courts,
http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal (last visited Sept. 07,
2016).
11. Primarily, the states are opposed to the existing stationary electric power plant
standards for carbon dioxide emissions. See generally Application by 29 States and State Agencies for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action During Pendency of Petitions for Review, West
Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (No. 15A773). The Clean Power Plan has standards for
both new and modified stationary electricity generating units, and for existing stationary electricity generating units, but this article will only be focusing on the existing stationary electric
power plant standards for carbon dioxide emissions. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines
for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64, 662. For
more information on the new and modified stationary electric power plant standards, please
see Standards of Performance, supra note 7; see also EPA, Carbon Pollution Standards for
New, Modified and Reconstructed Power Plants, http://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/carbonpollution-standards-new-modified-and-reconstructed-power-plants (last updated Nov. 24,
2015).
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rights and authority to regulate their electricity-generating facilities and general electricity services.12
However, despite this power battle between the states and the
EPA, there are vast benefits in the carbon dioxide emission reductions that could be achieved by the Clean Power Plan.13 With this
in mind, and the idea that this country cannot continue along the
path of least resistance by not regulating carbon dioxide emissions,
one must ask whether the states should continue relying on electric
facilities that meet consumers’ needs without regard for their
harmful environmental impacts. Can the states have their cake
and eat it too?
In answering this question, Part II of this article describes the
origins and progression of authority over time for both the states,
in energy regulation, and the EPA, in the promulgation of the
Clean Power Plan.14 Part III explores the current struggle between
the states and the EPA for regulatory authority over power plants
and endeavors to evaluate the strength of the power positions for
each.15 Part IV looks beyond the current power struggle, offering
guidance if the Plan is validated and offering a solution if the Plan
is invalidated while still promoting the underlying purpose of the
Plan: mitigating climate change through carbon dioxide emission
regulation.16 Finally, Part V concludes with a declaration to act
12. See State Petitioner’s Motion For Stay And For Expedited Consideration of Petition For Review, at 10–11 (2015) (No. 15-1363) (consolidated to West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S.
Ct. 1000 (2016)); see also Joint Reply of West Virginia, et al., Oklahoma, et al., North Dakota,
and Mississippi in Support of Motions for Stay and for Expedited Consideration, at 13–16
(2015) (No. 15-1363) (consolidated to West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016)).
13. The Clean Power Plan aims to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the power
sector by 32 percent below 2005 levels of carbon dioxide emission in order to mitigate the impacts of climate change. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power
Plan Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power Plants, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan (last updated Aug. 6, 2016). Climate change is recognized as one of the greatest environmental and public health challenges we face, due to its
impacts on Americans, and people throughout the world, via “stronger storms [and] longer
droughts, increased insurance premiums, food prices, and allergy” and asthma issues. See id.
14.

See infra Part II.

15.

See infra Part III.

16.

See infra Part IV.
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now.17 The states cannot always have it their way. They, as well as
the EPA, are charged with a duty to protect the health and welfare
of the people. Climate change will be confronted with carbon dioxide emission regulation, even if it means that society has to change
its business–as–usual course of actions within the energy sector.
II. TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF REGULATORY POWER
The battle for regulatory authority of electricity services began
as early as the eighteenth century. From borrowing some of the
ideals of English common law when first attempting to regulate
the distribution and access to electricity back in 1877,18 to state
regulatory commissions experimenting with regulatory authority
during the nineteenth century, energy regulation in the United
States has been developed through an evolution of experience.19
This evolution of experience began with predominant state regulation of electricity services with the federal government finally getting involved in 1920, via the Federal Water Power Act.20 Therefore, the states were initially the labs of democracy and regulatory
creation until the federal government felt it was necessary to intrude and assure that electricity services were fair.21
This evolution of regulation, with authority unevenly split between the state and federal level, and the current status of regulatory authority, has further fueled the dispute between the states
and the EPA. The source of both the states’ and EPA’s power to
regulate will reveal the underlying federalism and power issues,
which are crucial to the states’ argument that the Clean Power
Plan is arbitrary and capricious and the EPA is overstepping its
regulatory bounds.

17.

See infra Part V.

18. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876) (citing Lord Chief Justice Hale, De
Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts, 78).
19.

See RICHARD F. HIRSH, THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN
21–22, 29–31 (1999).

THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM,

20. See generally Water Power Act, 66 P.L. 369, 41 Stat. 1353 (1921). For further
information and an overview in regards to electricity regulation, with it entirely originating in
state regulation then progressing to federal regulation stepping in for interstate matters, see
HIRSH, supra note 19, at 9–31 (Ch.1: The Utility Consensus and Initial Challenges it Faced).
21.

See generally HIRSH, supra note 19.
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A. State Authority and the Origin of Energy Regulation
Ultimately, the states have a crucial source of power that originates from the Constitution.22 This source of state sovereignty is
found within the Tenth Amendment.23 The Supreme Court has
dealt with numerous cases that aid in defining what values or benefits federalism provides, via protecting state governments.24 The
three benefits typically provided by the protection of state governments are: “decreasing the likelihood of federal tyranny, enhancing
democratic rule by providing government that is closer to the people, and allowing states to be laboratories for new ideas.”25 Although these are not the only benefits that federalism provides,
these are typically the most commonly noted ones.
As the Tenth Amendment has been interpreted and analyzed
through numerous cases, an important principle of regulatory authority has been established. Congress cannot impermissibly commandeer state legislatures, agencies, or officials to implement federal mandates or regulations.26 Thus, it is unconstitutional for Congress to conscript state governments or compel affirmative mandates coercively in an area that was traditionally regulated by the
states.27
The Tenth Amendment has also been interpreted to provide
the states with a unique inherent power. This power is commonly

22.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.

23. Id. The Tenth Amendment provides, “The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Id.
24. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1992).
25.
ed. 2011).
26.

ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 320 (4th
New York, 505 U.S. at 166-67.

27. See Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 460; see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
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known as state police power.28 In the 1800s, the United States Supreme Court began resolving some conflicts over the power of the
states versus the power of the federal government.29 In 1847, Chief
Justice Taney explained the broad scope of the police power:
But what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing
more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And
whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish
offenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce
within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same
powers; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power
to govern men and things within the limits of its dominion.
It is by virtue of this power that it legislates; and its authority to make regulations of commerce is as absolute as its
powers to pass health laws, except insofar as it has been
restricted by the Constitution of the United States.30
By acknowledging the breadth of the police power as the power
to govern, Chief Justice Taney set an early precedent for supporting state rights.31 In later cases the Supreme Court referred to the
police power as the vast authority for states to do what was necessary for the public good.32 By 1954 the Court indicated that terms
like “public health, safety, . . . and welfare” were merely examples
of the police power and were not intended to limit its scope.33 “Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order—
these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional
application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they

28. Chief Justice John Marshall was first credited with using this term in 1827 as a
descriptive term to aid in categorizing state powers not delegated to the federal government.
See generally Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419 (1827).
29.

See generally Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504 (1897).

30.

Id. at 583.

31.

See generally id.

32.

See Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907).

33.

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31–32 (1954).
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merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it.”34 As
a result, while the Tenth Amendment leaves to the states what residual or left over powers that have not been reserved to the federal
government, these leftovers are quite substantial. This power and
sovereign right provides the states with broad authority to ensure
the protection of public health, safety, and welfare of their respective citizens.
Early on, the model of state regulation was greatly supported
as the proper mechanism for overseeing and controlling the natural monopoly power of electric utilities.35 The police powers given
to the states to be used “for the protection of the health, safety,
morals, and general welfare” of their respective citizens has been
supported and referenced by the Supreme Court since 1827, and is
applicable to utilities providing electricity services today.36
A unique feature of energy regulation in this country that supports states protecting its citizens’ general welfare, which is traceable to English common law,37 is that it is governed by a traditional
“regulatory compact.”38 This compact was designed to ensure that
reliable and consistent power supply was established for consumers at prices that are both just and reasonable.39 As a general assertion, one could simply state that utilities and their investors
“are provided a level of stability in earnings and value less likely
34.

Id.

35.

See Hirsh, supra note 19, at 15.

36.

See id.

37. English law provided significant guidance for the United States in deciding how
to regulate utilities. The idea of common businesses, or business serving the general public,
became entrenched during the sixteenth century when the English government gave exclusive
franchises to providers of certain services. These monopoly grants were given in exchange for
the requirement that providers, here utilities, charge reasonable rates and offered those services to all citizens without discrimination. See id. at 15–16.
38. See Johnathan A. Lesser & Leonardo R. Giacchino, Fundamentals of Energy Regulation, 35 ENERGY L. J. 219, 222 (2014).
39. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir.
1987); see also Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN.
L. REV. 1339, 1392 (2010) (explaining the underlying purpose of regulatory compact as the
need for “a consistent power supply at a reasonable price”).
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to be attained” in the absence of regulation, and “in turn, ratepayers are afforded universal, non-discriminatory service and protection from monopolistic profits.”40 This regulatory compact principle
was approved of back in 1887, when the Supreme Court in Munn
v. Illinois found that “when private property is ‘affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only’” and thus is “subject
to public regulation.”41 The Court also went on to establish two criteria that aid in deciding whether a company’s services fall within
this category of needing to be regulated.42 First, the business and
service provided must be a necessity for society,43 and second, the
business has to constitute a natural monopoly.44 Thus, as a quid
pro quo for being provided a monopoly status within a particular
vicinity for the provision of electricity services, utilities are subject
to regulation by the states, via state commissions. The commissions ensure that the utilities are prudent in their investments and
revenues so that the most efficient and best service possible will be
provided to their consumers.
Even as federal regulation has developed in the area of energy
regulation, Congress has hinted that the states still have discretion and authority over deciding energy profiles or electricity generation compositions. For example, when Congress was creating

40. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 810 F.2d at 1189; see also Office of Pub. Util.
Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 104 S.W. 3d 225, 227–28 (Tex. App. 2003) (“[A]n electricity
utility enters into a ‘regulatory compact’ with the public: in return for a monopoly over electricity service in a given area; the utility agrees to provide service to all requesting customers
and to charge only the retail rates set by the [Regulatory] Commission.”).
41.

94 U.S. 113, 126, 130 (1876) (internal quotation by Lord Chief Justice Hale).

42.

See id. at 127–28, 145.

43. Electricity services are extremely important for peoples’ health and general welfare. This is illustrated by the high correlation of electricity with important and beneficial
things like nutrition, literacy, population stability, life expectancy and infant survival; which
can be found in the United Nations Human Development Index reports. Over time it has been
established that a good indicator of a country’s level of development is its per capita use of
electricity. See Jude Clemente, The Statistical Connection Between Electricity and Human Development, POWER, (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.powermag.com/the-statistical-connection-between-electricity-and-human-development/; see generally Benjamin Attigah & Lucius MayerTasch, The Impact of Electricity Access on Economic Development: A Literature Review,
PRODUSE
(2013),
http://www.produse.org/imglib/downloads/PRODUSE_study/PRODUSE%20Study_Literature%20Review.pdf.
44.

See Munn, 94 U.S. at 127–28.
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the Federal Water Power Act,45 one of the members of the House
committee drafting the 1920 Act stated, “[w]e are earnestly trying
not to infringe the rights of the States. If possible we want a bill
that can not [sic] be defeated in the Supreme Court because of
omissions, because of the lack of some provision that we should
have put in the bill to safeguard the States.”46 When drafting the
Federal Power Act, Congress attempted to carefully confine the
Federal Power Commission, now the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, to “only . . . fill a hiatus which might otherwise exist
in the absence of state regulation,” and limited the Federal Power
Commission to “regulating only in the absence of state regulation.”47 Therefore, it is apparent that early on Congress was proactive in seeking to highlight and preserve regulatory authority for
the states in their traditional rights and powers over energy regulation.
This bright-line distinction between what the states can regulate versus what the federal government can regulate has been further illuminated over time. In 1927, the Supreme Court found in
Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam
and Electric Company that the states maintain jurisdiction over
business which is essentially local, while under the Commerce
Clause, Congress has the authority to regulate interstate sales of
electricity.48 The Court also went on to emphasize the differences
between state and federal regulation of electricity: the states have
the power to govern intrastate actions, including the generation of
electricity and its sale at retail to consumers, while the federal government has the power to regulate interstate issues, including the
transmission of electricity and wholesale electricity markets.49 By
1935, Congress enacted the Federal Power Act which further established the bright line barriers of authority by providing that
states retained jurisdiction “over facilities used for the generation

45.

66 Pub. L. 369, 41 Stat. 1353 (enacted March 3, 1921).

46. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 174 (1946) (quoting 56 Cong.
Rec. 9810).
47.

FPC v. S. Cal. Edison Cop., 376 U.S. 205, 218 (1964).

48.

See 273 U.S. 83, 85–86 (1927).

49.

See id.
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of electric energy or over facilities used in location distribution[,]
or only for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce, [and] over facilities for the transmission of electric energy
consumed wholly by the transmitter,” while the federal government retained jurisdiction over only “those matters which are not
subject to regulation by the states.”50 Therefore, the states retain
authority and regulatory control over electricity-generating facilities that provide power to their states’ citizens, along with the
transmission to end users and the retail rates charged to electric
customers; whereas the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission51
retains regulatory control over transmission lines, gas pipelines,
wholesale electric rates, and other things that are interstate affairs
within the electric industry realm.52
States have intrastate responsibilities when it comes to regulating electricity for its people. Typically, utility commissions or
state public utility commissions have the discretion over which
new power facilities receive certificates of public convenience and
necessity.53 State laws can restrict this discretion by providing
guidelines or requirements when siting new electric generating facilities; like taking into consideration whether or not the facility is
needed for base, intermediate, and peak loads, or if it is the lowest
cost system to provide for energy demand.54 It is also important

50.

16 U.S.C. § 824(a)–(b)(1) (2015).

51. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, previously known as the Federal
Power Commission, is an independent agency. See Department of Energy Organization Act,
Pub. L. 95-91, § 204, 91 Stat. 565 (1977); see generally FERC, What FERC Does,
http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp, (last updated June 24, 2014).
52. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 755 (1982) (the federal regulation of intrastate power transmission is proper because of interstate nature of generation and supply of
electricity); see also JOEY LEE MIRANDA, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, SECTION OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, AND RESOURCES, CAPTURING
THE POWER OF ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING, 6–8 (2009).
53. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, The Need for Power and the Choice of Technologies: State Decisions on Electric Power Facilities, 3 (June 1981).
54. See id. at 2–3. Base, intermediate, or peaking load refers to the overall time of
day demands and level of demands that consumers place on electricity generating facilities.
These categories are based on load factors which refers to the percentage of hours a power
plant can operate at its maximum capability in a given time. Base load facilities typically have
a load factor exceeding 75% and are typically heavily depended upon to provide constant reliable service; a coal burning facility would fall into this category. Intermediate load plants typically have load factors between 40% and 60%, like a hydroelectric plant. Peak load generators
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that state utility commissions, regulators, and utilities attempt to
plan ahead and forecast for future needs of certain electric generators to ensure a diverse energy portfolio.55 This is significant because a diverse energy mix has the potential to assure a continued
supply of electricity in the event of “a renewed oil embargo . . . [or]
shutdowns in nuclear plants,” while also ensuring that states remain self-sufficient in their ability to provide electricity services
for its people.56 Thus, state utility commissions have the ultimate
authority and discretion to choose whether or not to approve a utility’s new electric generating facility proposal and, therefore, to decide exactly what sources it deems necessary and sufficient to cost
effectively provide its citizens with electricity.
As a result, for the past one hundred or so years, states have
continued to control economic aspects of electricity generation,
such as “regulating electrical utilities for determining questions of
need, reliability, cost and other related state concerns.”57 This authority has been consistent with the traditional obligations and responsibilities of the states, while federal energy regulators have
had the authority to regulate “the need for and pricing of electrical
power transmitted in interstate commerce.”58
B. EPA Authority and the Clean Power Plan
The Constitution may not expressly mention the existence of
agencies, but Congress has created numerous agencies through
their legislative power.59 In the last century, Congress has routinely delegated quasi-legislative power to federal agencies like the

typically operate at low load factors between 5% and 15%, like photovoltaic solar panel generators. See John Hynes, How to Compare Power Generation Choices (Oct. 29, 2009),
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/print/rewna/volume-1/issue-1/solar-energy/how-to-compare-power-generation-choices.html.
55.

See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 53, at 3.

56.

Id.

57. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 205–06 (1983).
58.

Id.

59.

See U.S. CONST. art. I.
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Federal Communication Commission, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and many others.60 With this Congressional delegation, these agencies have rule
making power carrying the force of law.61 Congress has allowed
this for many reasons, but a significant one is that Congress often
delegates legislative power to administrative agencies in areas of
complex regulation that require specific expertise and knowledge
to solve specific problems.62 For example, figuring out what standards ensure that water quality or air quality is healthy is left to
the EPA since Congress does not have the specific expertise to handle such complex and scientific topics.63 Agencies also have executive and judicial power provided to them when Congress creates
them and thus they can enforce the regulations they promulgate
and adjudicate violations of their rules.64
The EPA is an independent agency with an interesting history. The agency is led by an Administrator, who is appointed by
the President and thus has cabinet-level status. The EPA,
uniquely, was not actually statutorily created.65 President Nixon
submitted an executive order to Congress on July 9, 1970, calling
for the establishment of the EPA in response to increasing concerns
about the inefficiency and inability of the existing agencies to combat the country’s growing environmental issues.66 Congress approved a plan to reorganize existing agencies to form a new, centralized agency for the environment, and, as a result, formed the
EPA on December 4, 1970.67

60.

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, at 333.

61.

See id. at 333-34.

62.

See RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 22–24 (2013).

63.

Id.

64.

See CHEMERINKSY, supra note 25, at 334.

65. Agencies are commonly “creatures of statute” because they are primarily created
by statute. See SEAMON, supra note 63, at 12.
66. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 3 OF 1970 (July 9, 1970),
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/reorganization-plan-no-3-1970; see generally ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY, EPA HISTORICAL PUBLICATION, THE GUARDIAN: ORIGINS OF THE EPA (1992),
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/guardian-origins-epa.
67. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, EPA ORDER 1110.2, INITIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec. 4, 1970), http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-order-
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During this creation period, and essentially ever since, the
EPA has been a very active agency. The EPA has broad authority
to enact regulations in accordance with the laws and orders it is
charged with administering, which are commonly designed to protect human health and the environment.68 Even in its early years,
the EPA placed approximately 1,500 rulemaking notices in the
Federal Register annually.69 The EPA promulgates all of these regulations, and the national standards within them, to ensure that
the citizens of this country are protected from significant risks to
human health and to reduce environmental risks.70
In enacting the Clean Air Act, a comprehensive regulatory
scheme for addressing the problem of air pollution, Congress did
not delegate authority to the EPA to carry out the administration
of the Act until 1970.71 In 1970, Congress enacted a comprehensive
set of amendments to the Clean Air Act that shifted the responsibility of administering it to the EPA, whereas before it was delegated to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.72 The
amendments provided the EPA with the authority to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards, develop New Source Performance Standards for new and modified sources of pollution, and
develop regulatory guidance for states to use in developing their
State Implementation Plans.73

11102. For more historical information on the EPA and its creation, see generally Phil Wisman, EPA History (1970-1985) (Nov. 1985), http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-19701985.
68. See generally ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Laws and Executive Orders,
http://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/laws-and-executive-orders (last updated Sept. 11, 2015).
69.

See Wisman, supra note 67.

70. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Our Mission and What We
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (last updated Aug. 18, 2016).

Do,

71. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970); see
also
Paul
G.
Rogers,
EPA
History:
The
Clean
Air
Act
of
1970,
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-clean-air-act-1970 (last updated Feb. 10, 2016).
72.

See id.

73.

See Rogers, supra note 71.

302

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 53

Then, in 1990 Congress added further amendments to clarify
and advance the Clean Air Act’s purpose.74 In doing so, the 1990
amendments divided the Clean Air Act into six titles.75 Title I deals
with preventing and reducing air pollution from stationary
sources, which is the main focus of the Clean Power Plan.76
The Clean Air Act, like other environmental statutes, successfully establishes a cooperative federalism regime.77 Congress delegated the task of setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards
for harmful air pollutants to the EPA while requiring the states to
devise State Implementation Plans to achieve those standards.78 If
the EPA disapproves of a state’s plan, it may substitute it with a
federal implementation plan.79 Therefore, Congress designed the
Clean Air Act with authority and responsibilities divided between

74.

The purposes outlined by the Clean Air Act are:

to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to
promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its
populations; to initiate and accelerate a national research and development program to achieve the prevention and control of air pollution; to
provide technical and financial assistance to State and local governments
in connection with the development and execution of their air pollution
prevention and control programs; and to encourage and assist the development and operation of regional air pollution prevention and control programs.
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (2015).
75.

See 42 U.S.C. §§7401–7671 (2015).

76. Stationary sources are all sources of air pollution, which result from immobile
facilities. These include, but are not limited to, power generation facilities, industrial facilities,
schools, and government facilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (2015).
77. Cooperative federalism refers to a concept in which the state governments and
the federal government share responsibility in the governance of the people for a common goal
or purpose. See Cooperative Federalism Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/cooperative-federalism/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2016). Here, under the Clean
Air Act, the common goal or purpose would be to ensure good air quality to protect the peoples’
health and general welfare. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (2015).
78. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431, (2015).; see also Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249
F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (the Clean Air Act establishes a commitment to cooperative federalism).
79. See Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1037; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Min., & Reclamation Ass’n. Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288–89 (1981) (if the state elects not to submit
a plan, the regulatory burden will fall onto the EPA, thus the states have freedom to choose).
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federal and state governments to advance air pollution mitigation
and establish an interdependent partnership that ensures emission reductions.
Specifically under the Clean Air Act, the EPA’s Administrator
is delegated the responsibility of establishing air quality standards, within section 111, for new and modified stationary sources
of air pollutions which must meet the New Source Performance
Standards for their particular industrial source category.80 These
New Source Performance Standards are “technology based” standards developed individually for industrial source categories, like
electric generation facilities.81 These standards set forth maximum allowable emission levels and are based on the best level of
pollution control currently demonstrated by sources within the
specific industry.82 Technology based New Source Performance
Standards are developed in an effort to reflect “the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction,” which has been “adequately demonstrated” in the relevant industrial sector.83 While evaluating the
best system of emission reduction applications, the EPA administrator must consider the “cost of achieving such reduction and any
non-air quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements.”84
Under section 111, the administrator of the EPA is required to
develop a New Source Performance Standard for a source category
if that source “causes, or contributes significantly to, air pollution
which may reasonable be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.”85 Once it is found that a source greatly impacts air quality

80.

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(b) (2015).

81.

See id. § 7411(d)(1).

82. See id. § 7411(a)(1). For example, carbon sequestration technologies have been
viewed as the best method to reduce emissions that have been adequately demonstrated by
the electric industry, even though it is not one of the most cost-effective measures. See Standards of Performance, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64, 727–28.
83.

Id. § 7411(a)(1).

84.

Id.

85.

Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A).
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via a certain air pollutant, like carbon dioxide, the administrator
will conduct and issue an endangerment finding which may find
that the source threatens the public health and welfare.86 Once this
finding is completed and published into the Federal Register, the
administrator can move forward in deciding how to regulate that
source for the pollutant at issue.87
The EPA was in a unique situation when it was propelled into
the position of regulating carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas, from
stationary sources. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court
decided that the EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gases
from motor vehicles under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.88 The
Court also decided that carbon dioxide, which is the most prevalent
and aggregately harmful greenhouse gas, qualifies as an “air pollutant” under § 302(g) of the Act.89 This determination that carbon
dioxide qualifies as an air pollutant within the Act’s regulatory
scheme allows for the EPA to regulate it via endangerment findings and promulgated standards under other sections of the Act.90
As a result, this extension of regulatory capability has propelled

86. See generally ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute
Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, EPA,
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/ (last updated Aug. 9, 2016) [hereinafter
Greenhouses Gases] (EPA’s endangerment finding for greenhouse gases instigated by the Supreme Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. EPA).
87. Id.; See also Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 239 (Dec. 15, 2009)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1).
88. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532–33 (2007). The EPA
endangerment finding that followed this decision, to regulate greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines (i.e. mobile sources), established that greenhouse
gases emitted from mobile sources may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare. See Greenhouse Gases, supra note 86. Here, in regards to stationary sources like
power plants, the EPA had a foundation to establish that a given category of sources, power
plants, may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. Although these
are two separate endangerment findings, the initial Section 202 endangerment finding established after this case was decided created a platform for the Section 111 endangerment finding
for power plants emitting greenhouse gases. Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7421, 7411(b)(1); see also generally Greenhouse Gases, supra note 86.
89.

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532.

90.

Id. at 533.
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the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from electric generating facilities, under section 111 of the Act, through its Clean
Power Plan regulation.91
III. DEBATING THE GREATEST GOOD: THE CURRENT
STRUGGLE FOR REGULATORY AUTHORITY
Due to the official publication of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan,
there is a growing debate as to who has the proper authority in
regulating energy. Proponents of state regulation claim that the
EPA has overstepped its bounds by attempting to regulate electricity generation at the state level and thus the regulation should be
repealed.92 However, the EPA, its supporters, and supporters of the
Plan claim that the EPA is well within its bounds in regulating
carbon dioxide as an air pollutant, and is making great strides towards mitigating climate change as well as serving the overarching purposes of the Clean Air Act.93 The ultimate issue underlying
these arguments and claims is whether the EPA, through its promulgation of the Plan, has overstepped its regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act by establishing a policy that sets emission
standards and essentially provides for how states should generate
electricity.

91. See Standards of Performance, supra note 7; see also Regulatory Actions- Developing carbon pollution standards for power plants under the Clean Air Act, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/regulatory-actions (last updated Feb. 11, 2015).
92. See generally Joint Reply of West Virginia, et al., Oklahoma, et al., North Dakota, and Mississippi in Support of Motions for Stay and for Expedited Consideration (2015)
(No. 15-1363) (consolidated to West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016)); see also
Naveena Sadasivam, Congress Launches Legislative Assault on Obama Administration’s
Clean Power Plan, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Oct. 28, 2015), http://insideclimatenews.org/news/28102015/congress-legislative-assault-obama-administration-clean-powerplan-mitch-mcconnell.
93. See generally Respondent EPA’s Opposition to Motions to Stay Final Rule, West
Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (No. 15-1363); see also Legal Analysis: Strong Likelihood EPA Climate Plan Will Stand Up in Court, ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND (July 30, 2015),
https://www.edf.org/media/legal-analysis-strong-likelihood-epa-climate-plan-will-stand-court.
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A. The Clean Power Plan: the EPA’s Strategy to Combat Carbon
Dioxide Emissions
The Clean Power Plan is a vast effort by the EPA to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions released by stationary electric generating
facilities.94 The goal of the Clean Power Plan is to reduce carbon
dioxide levels by 32 percent, from 2005 levels, by 2030.95 The rule
provides applicable carbon dioxide emission standards, or standards of performance, to new, modified, and existing stationary
power plants via its authority under the Clean Air Act, section
111.96
The Plan requires that states develop and submit their own
plans to the EPA, providing their methods and strategies to comply
with their state specific goals set by the EPA.97 If a state fails to do
this, the EPA will step in with their own federal plan.98 Moreover,
if the state submits a plan that is not deemed satisfactory by the
EPA, the EPA will promulgate a federal plan that directly limits
emissions from the state’s existing sources until the state submits
a satisfactory plan.99 However, it is important to note that the

94. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,665 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter 80 Fed. Reg. 64,665].
95.

Id.

96.

Id. at 64,510, 64,662–65.

97. For example, the EPA’s carbon dioxide emissions goals for the state of Idaho is
771 pounds per megawatt-hour by 2030. See EPA, Clean Power Plan: State at a Glance: Idaho
(Aug. 3, 2015), https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpptoolbox/idaho.pdf. Since all state goals fall
in a range between 771 pounds per megawatt-hour to 1,305 pounds per megawatt-hour, Idaho
has one of the more stringent state goals compared to other state goals in the Clean Power
Plan; i.e. Washington, Idaho’s neighboring state, has a goal of 983 pounds per megawatt-hour
by 2030. See EPA, Clean Power Plan: State at a Glance: Washington (Aug. 3, 2015),
http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpptoolbox/washington.pdf.
98.

80 Fed. Reg. 64,665, supra note 96, at 64,942.

99.

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(d)(2).
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Clean Power Plan is intended to be phased in gradually, over an
extended period of time.100
Although the regulation directs the states to provide a plan or
an initial submission by September 2016,101 the EPA is only requiring the states, through this submission, to request and obtain an
extension to complete their plans until September 2018.102 Or the
states may provide “minimal information” concerning the status of
the state’s planning and development efforts in the alternative of
requesting an extension.103 This “minimal information” requirement specifically requires the states to identify their planning
methods under consideration, including any progress to date, a description of opportunities for public input on their strategies to implement the regulation, and, if necessary, a sufficient explanation
for why the state needs an extension.104 Therefore, the states have
potentially up to two years to submit satisfactory plans to the
EPA.105
Within the Plan, the EPA has provided three building block
strategies for carbon dioxide emission reductions, or in other
terms, three best systems for emission reductions.106 These methods of emission reductions are: improving efficiency at power
plants, primarily coal burning plants, through modification and/or
partial carbon sequestration technologies; shifting energy generation from higher emitting coal to lower emitting natural gas power
plants; and shifting energy generation to zero emitting power

100. See Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan Cutting Carbon Pollution from
Power Plants, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan
(last updated Aug. 6, 2016).
101. This deadline is delayed now due to the Supreme Court’s order to stay the Plan.
See infra note 170 for more information.
102.

80 Fed. Reg. 64, 665, supra note 96, at 64, 947.

103.

Id.

104.

Id.

105.

Id.

106.

Id. at 64, 667.
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plants, i.e. renewable energy generators.107 The states also have
the option of purchasing emission rate credits from other states
that have low to zero emitting power plants via trading based emission programs.108
This is where the authority battle arises. By regulating and
thus attempting to recommend and implement these specific building blocks, the EPA is essentially establishing a policy of how each
state should regulate and design its energy generation portfolio.
Typically, the choice of what energy generation portfolio or mix
states have for electricity generation has been up to state energy
regulators. This attempt by the EPA, to establish a policy of preferable electricity generation options to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, is an indirect method of manipulating the states’ traditional
energy regulatory authority.
B. The Resultant Power War: States versus the EPA
In the pursuit of reducing carbon dioxide emissions while influencing the regulatory regime of electricity production, the EPA
and the states are in unique positions, authoritatively speaking.
Whereas one has congressionally delegated authority to regulate
air pollutants to protect and benefit this country’s welfare and
health, the other has both congressionally recognized and traditional sovereign authority over its decisions in electricity generation regulation.109 While the EPA has authority to regulate air pollutants under the Clean Air Act, the states argue that the manner
in which it is doing so here, through the promulgation of the Clean
Power Plan, is a far reaching step into their territory.
Although this is not the first attempt the EPA has made in
regulating power plants, this is the first of its kind that directs the
states to plan and implement methods of emission reductions that
extend beyond the fence line.110 This is chiefly why so many states

107.

Id.

108.

See 80 Fed. Reg. 64, 665, supra note 96, at 64, 709, 64, 834–35.

109. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (2015) (Clean Air Act findings and declaration of purpose);
see also 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 824(a), (b)(1).
110. Beyond the fence line can be understood by a comparison to methods of emission
reductions that can be achieved within the fence line of a power plant. For example, with a coal
burning power plant, a within the fence line emission reduction would be to modify it with
technological devices that increase heat rate (essentially increasing the plant’s efficiency) so it

2017

FOR THE GREATEST GOOD OF THE GREATEST
NUMBER: MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH
CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSION REGULATION

309

and utilities are challenging this regulation as being an abuse of
the EPA’s discretion—it exceeds the EPA’s authority under the
Clean Air Act, and it is arbitrary and capricious.111 As the EPA
ventures into this new territory of regulation, it is necessary to establish regulatory fence posts demarking the limit of states and
EPA influence within this dilemma.
1. The States’ Power Position: Arguments for State Authority
Over forty years ago, in District of Columbia v. Train, the D.C.
Circuit Court blocked a similar rulemaking by the EPA.112 This decision signified an important milestone in the evolving constitutional doctrines prohibiting “commandeering,” “entrenchment,”
and “coercion.”113 In its decision, the court found that Congress did
not delegate to the EPA the power to require states to adopt and
enforce the legal changes the agency wanted them to implement.114
The Court further found that the EPA could not achieve its purposes by requiring states to lend their police power.115

reduces carbon dioxide emissions, or to implement carbon capture sequestration which would
further reduce carbon dioxide emissions. These are both examples of within the fence line
emission reduction methods. Beyond the fence line methods of emission reductions are the
latter two building blocks that the Clean Power Plan recommends, which are switching generation to low-emitting natural gas burning power plants or zero emitting power plants like
wind or solar power generation. See infra Sections III.B.2.
111. See generally States Petitioners’ Motion for Stay & for Expedited Consideration
of Petition for Review, W. Va. v. EPA, USCA Case No. 15-1363 (Oct. 23, 2015); see generally
Joint Reply of West Virginia, et al., Oklahoma, et al., North Dakota, and Mississippi in Support
of Motions for Stay and for Expedited Consideration (2015) (No. 15-1363) (consolidated to West
Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016)). That motion for stay was denied by the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals on January 21, 2016. See Gavin Bade, DC Circuit Court denies stay on EPA
Clean Power Plan, UTILITYDIVE (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/dc-circuitcourt-denies-stay-on-epa-clean-power-plan/412514/.
112.

District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

113.

See id.

114.

Id.

115.

Id.
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Less than forty years later, the Supreme Court heard a case
that resulted in a blockade and rejection of a regulation implemented by the EPA that had the purpose of regulating carbon dioxide emissions.116 The Court revisited its earlier Massachusetts v.
EPA decision and read it as authority for Clean Air Act regulation
of carbon dioxide, but not necessarily for programmatic regulation,
understanding that the EPA may, under certain circumstances,
use best available control technology to force improvements in energy efficiency at plant levels.117 This can likely allow for regulation
of power plants at the “end-of-stack[s]” but not necessarily beyond
the fence lines, or beyond the power plant itself, essentially.118 The
Court also held that “[w]hen an agency claims to discover in a longextant statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American economy, we typically greet its announcement
with a measure of skepticism.”119 Under review, this provides some
insight as to how apprehensive regulators and courts should be
when analyzing whether the EPA has the authority to step in to
regulate the electric generating industry.
It is well established that federal agencies are to regulate
within their delegated realms of specialty or expertise.120 No federal agency may exercise regulatory jurisdiction not delegated to it
by Congress, especially if it has been already delegated to a different federal agency or reserved by the Constitution to the states.121
As discussed earlier, after many years of regulatory evolution, the
lines of authority in the energy regulatory realm are sufficiently
clear. The regulation of utilities “is one of the most important of
the functions traditionally associated with the police power of the
States.”122 Although there is a distinct federal role in regulating the
interstate affairs of electricity generation and transmission of
wholesale power, Congress delegated that authoritative role to the

116.

See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).

117.

Id. at 2444–46.

118.

See id. at 2447.

119.

Id. at 2444 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

120.

See SEAMON, supra note 62, at 22–24.

121.

See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 452 F.3d 822, 824 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

122.

Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983).
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, not the EPA.123 Thus,
technically speaking, the EPA has no regulatory authority over intra or interstate generation, transmission, or dispatch of electricity.124
Generally speaking, through the promulgation of the Clean
Power Plan, the EPA believes it has the authority to regulate outside of the electric generator’s fence line, induce states to exercise
their legislative power, and subject their regulatory officials to design satisfactory electricity generation plans.125 To the states, this
in and of itself is a coercive action in that it reduces state authority
in its traditional role of electricity generation planning.126 To protect the states and ideals of federalism, the Supreme Court has
prohibited the federal government from usurping the authority of
the states as well as prohibited state officers from being forced to
administer federal programs.127 Therefore, “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program.”128
In relation to EPA state implementation plans, which the EPA
essentially requires in the Clean Power Plan, in 2012 the Sixth
Circuit applied these “anti-commandeering principles” to hold that
state officials could not be enjoined to enforce, or penalized for lack
of enforcement, the provisions of a state implementation plan.129
Accordingly, although a state might propose and submit a satisfactory plan to the EPA, it could later alter its actions and not follow
123.

See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 792, 797 (2015).

124.

See id.

125. See generally Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64, 662; see generally Application
by 29 States and State Agencies for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action During Pendency
of Petitions for Review, W. Va. v. EPA, No. 16 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016).
126. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997); see also New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
127.

See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925; New York, 505 U.S. at 188.

128.

New York, 505 U.S. at 188.

129. See Sierra Club v. Korleski, 681 F.3d 342, 348–50 (6th Cir. 2012) (the state
elected to not enforce its plan since the EPA rejected its request to amend).
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through with its plan.130 Once a state has submitted a satisfactory
plan, the EPA can only induce a state to comply with its plan and
the EPA’s overarching carbon dioxide reduction goals through noncoercive means.131 However, the EPA has specifically chosen to direct the states to incorporate state plans assuring that they meet
certain carbon dioxide reduction levels via the states’ own policing
powers because the EPA itself lacks the regulatory authority to police power generation and distribution. This makes it more apparent that ultimately the rule may not work as efficiently the EPA
had intended since it is relying on cooperative federalism establishing partnerships between itself and the states. This intrepid
regulatory endeavor is facing hurdles due to its attempt to influence and dictate how states generate their electricity.
2. The EPA’s Power Position: Arguments for EPA Authority
Despite these challenges and state energy regulatory hurdles,
the EPA has its sources for its regulatory authority, generally, as
well as for its promulgation of the Clean Power Plan. First and
foremost, it is important to note that the EPA has gone through
proper administrative procedures in promulgating the Clean
Power Plan regulation132 and has referenced section 111(d) as its
ultimate authority for regulating stationary electric generating facilities.133 Although the text of section 111 has been interpreted as
applying only to end-of-stack technology, here the end-of-stack
emission reduction technology for electric generating units, this
does not strictly mean that it only applies to within the fence line
technologies.134 In fact, there is important precedent for incorporating beyond the fence line methods in section 111 standards and

130.

Id.

131.

Id. at 352–53.

132. See generally ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants:
Rule History, EPA (last updated Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/cleanpower-plan-existing-power-plants#rule-history; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(b), (d) (2015) (the
EPA Administrator shall, after designating air pollutants, establish and promulgate regulations and standards for those air pollutants through informal rulemaking; such standards are
effective upon promulgation). For more information on informal rulemaking, please see
SEAMON, supra note 62, at 243–82 (Chapter 12- Informal Rulemaking).
133.

See Standards of Performance, supra note 7.

134. See Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 372; see also Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task
Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 534–36 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upheld another beyond the fence line
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thus establishing authority for the EPA to allow beyond fence line
messures for emission reductions.135
In the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress established
that section 111 standards could and should reflect the availability
of fuel pretreatment measures that could lower emissions of regulated air pollutants, like coal washing.136 Congress recognized that
these strategies were typically implemented at offsite facilities
since they did not distinguish between onsite and offsite measures
of pretreatment capabilities.137 Rather, Congress instructed the
EPA to “give credit for accepted minemouth and other precombustion fuel cleaning processes, whether they occur at, or are achieved
by, the source or by another party.”138 Two years after these amendments were established, the EPA created a sulfur dioxide standard
for coal fired power plants that included a fuel pretreatment requirement. In Sierra Club v. Costle, the sulfur dioxide standard
was challenged but the court upheld it after explaining that the
standard was based on the idea that “utilities would enter into contract arrangements with their suppliers to obtain and guarantee
that coal supplies meet the needed treatment criteria,” which the
court viewed as a lawful exercise of EPA’s authority under section
111, and thus upheld a beyond the fence line measure of pretreating coal supplies before they are sent to power plants.139 Thus, establishing early precedent for the availability of EPA’s authority to
establish beyond the fence line measures of emission reductions.
Although two of the three building blocks recommended to be
implemented by the EPA require beyond the fence line measures,
Congress and the courts have both allowed the EPA to establish
such measures. However, it is important to recognize, according to
measure in order for small refiners to meet lead concentration standards); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 95-564 at 130 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1502, 1510–11).
135.

See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, title I, §109(b) (1977).

136.

See id.

137.

Id.

138.

H.R. REP. NO. 95-564, supra note 134, at 130.

139. 657 F.2d 298, 372–73 (D.C. Cir. 1981); See also Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down,
705 F.2d 506, 534–36.
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the text of section 111, that such measures must be adequately
demonstrated.140 Demonstration is likely not a concern for the EPA
here, considering switching to natural gas burning generating facilities and renewable energy generation are technologies that
have been demonstrated as effective methods for reducing emissions for a long time.141 For example, the ability to transform an
electric generating faciliy from burning coal to burning natural gas
is becoming more efficient, and the dependence upon renewable
electricity generating facilities is on the rise with more states implementing renewable energy portfolio standards.142 Therefore, the
EPA likely has legitimate authority in stating that these building
block strategies of emission reductions have been sufficiently adequately demonstrated.
In addition, the Clean Air Act itself provides a broad policy of
regulatory authority delegated specifically to the EPA. In promulgating the Clean Power Plan, the EPA is addressing one of the
most important and urgent environmental challenges experienced
throughout the world. By attempting to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions, the EPA can mitigate the significant “threat to Americans’ health and welfare” caused by long enduring changes in our
climate, which potentially could result “in an array of severe negative effects.”143 These effects include, but are not limited to,
“drought, disease, increasingly serious weather events, and rising

140.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2015).

141. See Kennedy Maize, Tricky Business: Taking Down Old Coal Plants, POWER
MAGAZINE (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.powermag.com/tricky-business-taking-down-old-coalplants/?pagenum=1; see also Warren Leon, THE STATE OF STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARDS, CESA STATE-FEDERAL RPS COLLABORATIVE, 4–5 (June 2013),
http://www.cesa.org/assets/2013-Files/RPS/State-of-State-RPSs-Report-Final-June-2013.pdf;
see also Energy sources have changed throughout the history of the United States, EIA (July 3,
2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11951. To view the most updated or
recent information about state renewable energy programs and how much renewable energy
state programs specifically require, see generally DSIRE, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICES (Aug. 2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf.
142. See Maize, supra note 141; see also U.S. Energy Information Administration,
Idaho State Profile and Energy Estimates, Analysis, EIA (last updated Nov. 19, 2015),
http://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.cfm?sid=ID#64 [hereinafter U.S. Energy Information Administration].
143. See Respondent EPA’s Opposition to Motions to Stay Final Rule, USCA Case 151363, at 1 (Dec. 3, 2015).
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sea levels.”144 In addition to reducing carbon dioxide emissions, the
Plan will also be able to reduce existing power plants’ emissions of
smog and soot forming pollutants like sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and fine particles.145 These pollution reductions have the potential to lower the rates of asthma attacks, respiratory disease,
heart attacks, and premature deaths that occur each year due to
the exposure of these pollutants.146 The EPA has valued the climate
and health benefits of implementing the Clean Power Plan in the
tens of billions of dollars. 147 Therefore, these potential emission
reductions have the vast potential to not only improve the environment for future generations, through mitigating future emissions
of carbon dioxide and thus alleviating some of the effects of climate
change, but to also improve the present health and welfare of
Americans. This significantly furthers the Clean Air Act’s purposes
of protecting and enhancing air quality so as to promote public
health and welfare.148 As a result, when considering the significant
impacts and benefits the EPA’s promulgation of this Plan has, and
its overarching goal of carrying out the Clean Air Act’s regulatory
purpose, the EPA has the authority to regulate carbon dioxide
emissions from stationary electricity generating facilities.
To further analyze whether the EPA has proper authority to
promulgate the Clean Power Plan under the Clean Air Act, comparing the Plan to the EPA’s lead reduction program provides insights as to how far the EPA’s regulations may reach. Lead emissions have historically been attributed to fuels in on–road motor
vehicles, such as cars and trucks, and industrial processes, like

144.

Id.

145. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,670, 64,680–81 (Oct. 23, 2015).
146. See EPA, EPA-452/R-15-003, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN
POWER PLAN FINAL RULE, at 4-31, table 4-24 (Aug. 2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-final-rule-ria.pdf (summarizing health benefits associated
with anticipated reduction in ozone and fine particle pollution).
147.

See id. at 4-45, table 4-31.

148.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b).
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lead smelters.149 Once ingested through the air or water, lead can
accumulate in a person’s blood and bones which can adversely impact their nervous system, kidney function, and immune system.150
Due to this highly negative impact to human health, the EPA has
promulgated standards for lead emissions under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards.151 The first lead regulation was promulgated by the EPA in 1978 and it was updated to a stricter standard in 2008.152
Under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards program
in the Clean Air Act, if a state fails to submit an implementation
plan for achieving the lead standards, it could likely face a loss of
highway funds or other sanctions.153 Also, if a specific state plan
item is not met, in furtherance of achieving lead emission reductions, the Administrator of the EPA has the discretion to issue
sanctions.154 Sanctions like these which can appear to be coercive
in nature within cooperative federalism programs like this, have
been upheld in numerous cases that involve Tenth Amendment
challenges claiming that the EPA is being overly coercive.155

149. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Basic Information about Lead Air Pollution: How Does
Lead Get in the Air?, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/lead-air-pollution/basic-information-aboutlead-air-pollution#how (last updated March 30, 2016).
150. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Basic Information about Lead Air Pollution: What are
the Effects of Lead on Human Health, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/lead-air-pollution/basic-information-about-lead-air-pollution#health (last updated March 30, 2016).
151.

See 40 CFR § 50.12 (2009); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2015).

152. See 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (Oct. 5, 1978); see also 73 Fed. Reg. 66,964 (Nov. 12, 2008).
The lead standard was decreased from 1.5 micrograms per cubic meter of air to 0.15 micrograms per cubic meter of air.
153.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(m); 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b).

154.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a)–(b).

155. Compare Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 177-79 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (state is not at risk of losing all federal funds if it refuses to submit SIP; sanction is a
“relatively mild encouragement to the states”), with New York, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (a
choice between regulating under one federal instruction or forcing the state to submit to another instruction if it declines the first is no choice at all), and Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2634 (2012) (finding unconstitutional a monetary inducement that
was so coercive it compels the states to act).
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Compared to this program of regulation, the Clean Power Plan
appears to be relatively harmless. Unlike the penalty provision under section 110(m) for states implementation plans for specific air
pollutants, like lead, regulated under the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards section, the Clean Power Plan does not impose
any penalties for states.156 If a state chooses to not submit a plan
the EPA will implement a federal plan itself.157 The states can also
agree to work with the EPA, implementing certain aspects of the
Clean Power Plan while leaving the others to the EPA to implement.158 Therefore, in comparison to other regulations of air pollutants, like lead, where the EPA has the potential to impose penalties for noncompliance, the Clean Power Plan involves minimal coercion.
C. The Current Battle: Ensuing Litigation Between the States
and the EPA
Less than twelve hours after the Clean Power Plan was published in the Federal Register on October 22, 2015, twenty-six
states and numerous industry associations filed over fifteen separate cases challenging the EPA regulation.159 The lawsuits have
been consolidated into one case, led by West Virginia and other
states in opposition to the regulation, at the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.160 So far twenty-six
of the fifty states have joined in opposition to the Plan, along with

156. See generally Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,942.
157.

See id. at 64,669, 64,947.

158.

See id. at 64,942.

159.

See E&E Publishing, LLC, supra note 10.

160. See Andrew Childers, States Ask Supreme Court to Review Clean Power Plan
Stay, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT REPORTER (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.bna.com/statesask-supreme-n57982066591/. The states and state agencies joining in opposition of the EPA’s
Clean Power Plan are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality, Mississippi Public Service Commission, North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, and Oklahoma Department of
Environmental Quality. Id.
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coal industry members, utilities, and the United States Chamber
of Commerce.161 While the D.C. Circuit denied the motions made to
stay the rule or block the standards while litigation ensues, it also
announced its desire for the case to proceed quickly by scheduling
oral arguments for June 2, 2016.162 However, on February 9, 2016,
after the states applied for a stay with the Supreme Court,163 the
Court ordered a stay on the Clean Power Plan in a five to four
vote.164 Shortly after this decision, the D.C. Circuit announced that
it would hear the case en banc on September 27, 2016.165 Therefore,

161. See id; see also Geoffrey Barnes & Danelle Gagliardi, How Challengers Obtained
the Stay that Put US EPA’s Clean Carbon Plan on Hold, FRESH (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://www.freshlawblog.com/2016/02/10/how-challengers-obtained-the-stay-that-putus-epas-clean-carbon-plan-on-hold/.
162.

See E&E Publishing, LLC, supra note 10.

163. See generally States Petitioners’ Motion for Stay & for Expedited Consideration
of Petition for Review, W. Va. v. EPA, USCA Case No. 15-1363 (Oct. 23, 2015) (Application by
29 states and state agencies for immediate stay of final agency action during pendency of petitions for review).
164. This is an unusual and significant course of action that the Court has not taken
before, which emphasizes how controversial and critical this regulation is, and has led some
commentators to believe the Court is reacting to its previous dealings with the EPA’s MATS
case. In that case, by the time the rule was partially invalidated by the Court, numerous power
plants had already invested lots of money and complied with the rule, specifically up to 80%
complied with the rule. Therefore, this could have influenced the Court in a concern for equity
to stay the status quo and not allow the same course of action occur again. See Emily Holden,
Elizabeth Harball & Ellen M. Gilmer, SCOTUS halts Clean Power Plan, stuns states planning
carbon cuts, E&E PUBLISHING (Feb. 10, 2016), www.eenews.net/stories/1060032137; see also,
Patrick Parenteau, Supreme Court Plays Politics with the Clean Power Plan, ACSBLOG (Feb.
10, 2016), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/supreme-court-plays-politics-with-the-clean-powerplan; Greg Stohr & Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Obama’s Clean-Power Plan Put on Hold by U.S. Supreme Court, BLOOMBERGPOLITICS (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-02-09/obama-s-clean-power-plan-put-on-hold-by-u-s-supreme-court; Lyle Denniston, Carbon Pollution Controls Put On Hold, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 9, 2016) (five to four vote
with Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Ginsburg, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor dissenting),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/carbon-pollution-controls-put-on-hold/#more-238111.
165. See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Power Plant to get unanticipated en banc review,
THE WASHINGTON POST (May 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/05/16/clean-power-plan-to-get-unanticipated-en-banc-review/; Andrew Childers, Full D.C. Circuit to Hear Clean Power Plan Argument, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 16, 2016),
http://www.bna.com/full-dc-circuit-n57982072479/. The D.C. Circuit heard oral arguments
over the Clean Power Plan on September 27, 2016, bypassing the usual hearing before a threejudge panel. See Jonathan H. Adler, The en banc D.C. Circuit meets the Clean Power Plan, THE
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until the D.C. Circuit finishes its review and the Supreme Court
has finished its likely review, the deadlines within the Plan are
delayed and the rule is overall at a standstill.
Generally speaking, the challengers of the EPA regulation argue that the EPA is overstepping its authority under section 111(d)
of the Clean Air Act by regulating broadly in the area of electricity
generation, which impacts a vast part of the economy, traditionally
regulated by the states.166 The challengers’ argument further concludes that the EPA is barred from using section 111(d) to regulate
stationary power plants and that it is an unconstitutional invasion
of sovereign state rights.167
V. BALANCING THE POWER POSITIONS: A SOLUTION FOR
THE GREATEST NUMBER
No matter how the ensuing litigation results, the EPA will regulate carbon dioxide emissions in some way or another. With executive approval, along with Supreme Court decisions that support
the EPA’s ability to regulate carbon dioxide emissions under the
Clean Air Act, there is no question that the EPA can regulate this
air pollutant.168 The significant question to consider is how the
EPA should regulate carbon dioxide emissions and what methods
can the EPA prescribe without over stepping its regulatory bounds
under the Clean Air Act. In addition, although the Clean Power

WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/28/the-en-banc-d-c-circuit-meets-the-clean-powerplan/?utm_term=.f24e392966b0.
166. See generally Joint Reply of West Virginia, et al., Oklahoma, et al., North Dakota,
and Mississippi DEQ in Support of Motions for Stay & For Expedited Consideration, W. Va. v.
EPA, USCA Case No. 15-1363 (Dec. 23, 2015).
167.

Id.

168. See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
(June 25, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-sector-carbon-pollution-standards; see also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497, 532
(2007); see also Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
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Plan is so expansive it will inevitably transform the electricity sector,169 the Supreme Court has taken note of this through its decision to stay the Plan and is also concerned about the vast impact
of the Plan in action.170 Thus, it is necessary and imperative to consider a potential alternative solution the EPA could promulgate if
the Supreme Court invalidates the rule.
A. A World with the Clean Power Plan
The EPA appears to be within its regulatory bounds in its current promulgation of the Clean Power Plan. By establishing state
specific guidelines and standards of performance for existing stationary electricity generating facilities, under section 111 of the
Clean Air Act, the EPA is simply providing a backdrop of requirements and recommendations that the states need to consider in
developing their state implementation plans.171
Although the EPA sets out three specific building block strategies that the states can choose from while establishing their state
plans, this list is not exhaustive.172 Nor is it a hard–line set of requirements that the states are obligated to choose from.173 The EPA
primarily utilized these three emission reduction methods as a
guide to illustrate adequately demonstrated measures.174 Therefore, the states have flexibility in choosing whatever emission reduction methods they desire when developing their state plans so
long as they can show a satisfactory attempt to achieve their state
specific emission reduction targets.175

169. See Util. Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2437–38 (an agency cannot exercise
significant and transformative power unless it has clear congressional authorization).
170.

Id.

171. See 42 U.S.C §7411(d)(1); 40 C.F.R. §60.23–.24; see also Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed.
Reg. at 64,662, 64,667.
172. See generally Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,667–69, 64,966.
173.

See id. at 64,710.

174.

See id. at 64,709.

175.

Id.
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Thus, although the states may feel as though their regulatory
territory is being intruded upon, it is ultimately their choice
whether or not they let the EPA micromanage their energy resource choices or they regulate it themselves in a manner that complies with the EPA’s emission reduction goals.176 The states generally have a sufficient amount of flexibility in deciding how to comply and achieve their emission reduction targets. For example, besides the three building block strategies set out by the EPA in the
Clean Power Plan, states can achieve their emission reduction targets through promoting energy efficiency measures or demand response energy efficiency programs,177 or by participating in an
emissions trading program by selling or purchasing credits178 from
other states.179 Since twenty-nine states have well established re-

176. As previously mentioned, if states do not choose to submit a plan that is satisfactory to the EPA or they elect not to submit a plan at all, the EPA will initiate a federal implementation plan for the state. However, even if a state has a federal implementation plan applied to it, the state still has the option to go back to the drawing board and develop a state
plan to submit to the EPA. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64, 669, 64, 947; see also 42 U.S.C.
§7411(d)(2).
177. Energy efficiency programs are promulgated to reduce energy used by specific
end-use devices and systems without affecting the services provided, like energy efficient light
bulbs, heat recovery systems, and efficient heat pumps. See Definition of Energy Efficiency,
Electricity, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm (select the letter “E” within the search form; then scroll down to “Energy Efficiency,
Electricity”). Whereas demand response programs are incentive based programs encouraging
electric power consumers to temporarily reduce their demand for power at certain times of the
day in exchange for a reduction in their electric bills. Definition of Demand Response Programs, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm (select the letter “D” within the search form; then scroll down to “Demand Response
Programs”). Both of these options aid in lowering carbon dioxide emissions through reductions
in energy consumption. See id.
178. Credits are determined based on the amount of emission reductions that can be
achieved through methods that shift energy generation to lower emitting resources, like gas
burning power plants or renewable energy power plants, or methods that generally reduce
energy demand. See e.g., Memorandum from Brian McLean, Office of Atmospheric Programs,
to the Regional Air Division Directors (Aug. 5, 2004) (example of credit determinations and
formulas for state implementation plans utilizing renewable energy and energy efficiency
measures).
179. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,927 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
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newable portfolio standards and eight states have renewable portfolio goals, there is a very high chance that states will have the
ability to utilize market-based trading programs, like cap and
trade.180 This will help states that, while developing their compliance plans, cannot necessarily switch to lower emitting electric
generating facilities easily or within the near future.181 As a result,
despite these indirectly intrusive attempts at regulating carbon dioxide emissions through regulating stationary electricity generating facilities, the states still have the flexibility and freedom to
choose how they will comply with their state emission targets.
Therefore, to reach a well-suited compromise that allows the
EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions emitted from electricity
generating facilities but also allows the states to continue maintaining their authority to choose what electricity generation facilities produce energy within their geographical bounds, it is imperative that the EPA’s regulation provides standards with which
states have the freedom to comply. Section 111 of the Clean Air Act
requires that the EPA promulgate standards based on the best
methods of emission reductions taking into consideration
measures that are adequately demonstrated, which it has done in

pt. 60); see also Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,709, 64,834–37.
180. DSIRE & U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies (Aug.
2016),
http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/RenewablePortfolio-Standards.pdf. For example, although Idaho does not have a renewable portfolio
standard policy, its neighboring states Washington, Oregon, Montana, and Nevada have these
policies which could aid Idaho if it had the need to buy or sell emission credits from or to any
of these states that are encouraging renewable energy development. See id.
181. States allege that shifting energy generation will be burdensome due to stranded
costs, and not being able to take full advantage of the useful life of fossil fueled power plants.
With an emission credit trading system, these states could take advantage of the opportunity
to buy credits from states that have the capability to shift to lower emitting or zero emitting
electric power plants while using their fossil fueled power plants. See Fact Sheet: Clean Power
Plan, The Role of States- States Decide How They Will Cut Carbon Pollution, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-05/documents/20140602fs-states-role.pdf. (last
updated May 11, 2015). However, if these stranded costs of investments made years ago for
fossil fuel burning facilities are abandoned or incorporated into other costs of shifting electricity generation, electricity customers’ rates will likely be negatively impacted. See generally
Commissioner Tony Clark Statement, Environmental Protection Agency 111(d) Regulations,
FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.ferc.gov/media/statementsspeeches/clark/2015/08-03-15-clark.asp#.VrAoFNDFvid.
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its Clean Power Plan.182 However, by its emphasis on the three
building block strategies, it appears that the states take the EPA’s
approach as a direct requirement or instruction that they must utilize such building blocks to be in compliance with the Act. Since
this is not necessarily the case, due to the flexibility provided by
the Plan, the EPA should have made it clear in their regulation
that the states are still able to retain authority and discretion in
their energy generator diversity. For example, with the flexibility
inherent in the Plan and its current and future opportunities to
expand potential carbon dioxide emission reductions, Idaho is an
exemplary state to evaluate with the Plan’s primary goal of reducing emissions in mind.
1. Idaho’s Victory in Reducing Emissions
With or without the Clean Power Plan, Idaho will still likely
meet, and potentially go beyond, its emission reduction goals set
out by the EPA with its unique electricity generation portfolio, and
its future trajectory trends and opportunities. According to the
EPA’s estimates, Idaho’s 2012 historic level of carbon dioxide emission rate is 858 pounds per megawatt hour.183 In the Plan, Idaho’s
final goal for 2030 and beyond is 771 pounds per megawatt hour.184
The EPA projects that even without the Plan, Idaho could reduce
its carbon dioxide emissions down to 766 pounds per megawatt
hour.185
For a typical red state, Idaho is unique in that its readily available energy resources are very green. Although Idaho does not
have a renewable portfolio standard program or goal, it does not
necessarily need one due to its high reliance on renewable energy
resources. Overall, the balance of Idaho’s net electricity generation

182.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (1990); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.23–24 (1995).

183. Clean Power Plan: State at a Glance: Idaho EPA, (Aug. 3, 2015),
https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpptoolbox/idaho.pdf.
184.

See id.

185.

See id.
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is supplied by hydropower, wind, natural gas, biomass, geothermal, and coal fired generation.186 In 2014, 82 percent of Idaho’s net
electricity generation came from renewable energy resources.187
Hydroelectric power alone supplied 60 percent of Idaho’s net electricity generation while its wind generation capability increased by
13 percent and provided 18 percent of its net electricity generation.188
Although these statistics illustrate that Idaho is an environmentally friendly and self-sufficient electricity generating state,
Idaho does import approximately 35 percent of its electricity from
neighboring states.189 This is primarily because Idaho has no coalfired power plants within its borders and is beginning to develop
natural gas; currently most of its natural gas supply is piped into
the state from its neighboring states and Canada.190
In a preexisting effort to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and
reliance on coal power, Idaho has planned to reduce its coal fired
electricity generation consumption by shutting down the coal
power plants it co-owns in other states. For example, Idaho Power
owns half of the North Valmy coal fired power plant and typically
receives half of the plant’s electricity generation.191 Both Idaho
Power and North Valmy Energy, the other co-owner of the plant,
have agreed to decommission the plant by the end of 2025.192 Idaho
186.

See id.

187. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 142. Idaho typically is
among the top ten states for renewable energy production, usually found between either the
top ranked to the fifth top ranked positions depending on the factors considered in a study or
analysis. See id.; see also How Green Is Your State? OLIVET NAZARENE UNIVERSITY (Nov. 5,
2015), http://graduate.olivet.edu/news-events/news/how-green-your-state.
188.

See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 142.

189. See id.; see also IDAHO STRATEGIC ENERGY ALLIANCE, IDAHO ENERGY PRIMER
2015 at 9, 35 (2015).
190.

See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 142.

191. Ken Miller, Idaho Power’s 2015 IRP Nears Completion, SNAKE RIVER ALLIANCE
(June 22, 2015), http://snakeriveralliance.org/idaho-powers-2015-irp-nears-completion/; see
generally NV Energy, North Valmy Generating Station, NV ENERGY INC., https://www.nvenergy.com/company/energytopics/images/Valmy_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last updated April 2015)
(North Valmy plant description).
192. Ken Miller, Idaho Power’s 2015 IRP Nears Completion, SNAKE RIVER ALLIANCE
(June 22, 2015), http://snakeriveralliance.org/idaho-powers-2015-irp-nears-completion/.

2017

FOR THE GREATEST GOOD OF THE GREATEST
NUMBER: MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH
CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSION REGULATION

325

Power and Portland General Electric co-own the Boardman coal
fired power plant and also plan to decommission the plant by the
end of 2020.193 Both of these coal-fired power plants shutting down
in the future would amount to at least 525 megawatts of high emitting power displaced.194 With a trajectory of Idaho power companies and the utilities investing in more renewable energy systems
and energy efficiency programs,195 which would reduce energy consumption and replace the heavy emitting energy supplies with low
to zero emitting energy supplies, Idaho is on track to meet its citizens’ energy demands while further reducing carbon dioxide emissions. Therefore, Idaho is on a great path, with its diverse electricity generation capabilities, to meet and even go beyond emissions
reductions recommended by the EPA. Many other states could take
note of Idaho’s trajectory and investment strategies to gauge
whether they are along a similar path of carbon dioxide emission
reductions without the EPA’s regulatory oversight through a federally implemented state plan.
2. The Downfall of Noncompliant States: A Push in the Right
Direction
The EPA’s Clean Power Plan does offer an option for those
states that initially choose to be stubborn and non-compliant. The
Plan provides that if states choose to decline to prepare and submit
their own compliance plans to reduce carbon dioxide emissions,
then the EPA will promulgate a federal plan for the affected power

193. See Ted Sickinger, PGE Plan to Close Coal-Fired Boardman Power Plant by 2020
Could Set National Precedent, THE OREGONIAN (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2010/12/pge_plan_to_close_coal-fired_b.html.
194. Miller, supra note 192 (shutting down both coal fired power plants, North Valmy
and Boardman which Idaho utilizes 260 megawatts and 275 megawatts from respectively,
would add up to 535 megawatts of heavy emitting energy displaced).
195. See id. (this ultimately results in a win-win scenario for both utilities, power companies, and electricity consumers); see also IDAHO STRATEGIC ENERGY ALLIANCE, supra note
189, at 24–31, 35 (Idaho’s investments in both renewable energy system development and integration, and energy efficiency programs help create jobs, reduce energy consumption, increase profits for both end use consumers and power companies, and reduce carbon dioxide
emissions);
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plants in that state.196 However, the EPA does not have authority
to impose sanctions on a state for failing to submit a plan.197 Therefore, unless the states view the EPA’s federal oversight over their
electricity generating facilities that emit carbon dioxide to be a
punishment in of itself, it appears as though the states are not facing any harsh punishments for failing to comply, like a hefty fine.
The states also have the option to work with the EPA and implement certain aspects of the Plan themselves while leaving other
aspects to the EPA to implement.198 Also, the states that fail to
comply with the Plan and find that they do not favor the EPA overseeing their affected power plants, have the option to prepare and
adopt a state plan, which the EPA would have to approve, that
could supplant the federal plan implemented by the EPA.199 Therefore, a state could choose to be stubborn by not complying with the
Plan and face no EPA imposed sanctions, but it will have to face a
federally implemented plan created by the EPA or choose to step
up and supplant it with a state plan of its own.
As a result, despite the states’ frustrations with the perceived
flexibility of the Clean Power Plan and their argument that the
Plan is an unnecessary intrusion into their authoritative bounds
in energy regulation, the EPA is not commandeering their authority to choose which electricity power plants to turn on and off. The
states still maintain this choice despite the EPA’s regulatory influence. The EPA’s authority is essentially peppered with state regulatory authority to decide which electricity-generating facilities to
use while ensuring that they are reducing carbon dioxide emissions
and preventing the potential continuance of public and environmental neglect. Through the Plan, the EPA is attempting to promulgate a traditional cooperative federalism program with the purpose and goal of benefiting the greater good. Whether or not the
states agree with how they individually get to that result— by cooperating with the EPA or running their own electricity regime in
light of the carbon dioxide standards—is that states’ own problem.
In addition, with or without the Clean Power Plan in place, the
EPA could choose to implement a progressive region by region market based emissions cap system, like the Region Greenhouse Gas

196. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,942, 64,987–88 (Oct. 23, 2015).
197.

See id. at 64,942.

198.

See id.

199.

See id.
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Initiative, that could provide the states with flexibility and benefits
in meeting emission reductions. In the end, the EPA is just functioning as the regulatory parent the states sometimes need, despite
their denial, so that states can continue to use their sovereign authority and power to ensure the peoples’ health and welfare.
B. A World Without the Clean Power Plan: A Compromise
Through Regional Market-Based Program
Given the Supreme Court’s bold move in staying the Clean
Power Plan, and the potential for the Court to find that the EPA is
taking too big of a step without a clear congressional directive that
justifies or guides its actions, it is necessary to consider the world
without the Plan in action. Even without the Plan in effect, the
states’ ongoing trends provide reason to be optimistic about the
overall goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions.200 Numerous
power companies and utilities have expected some form of governmental climate action for years now and have already made, and
are continuing to make, efforts to get ahead of the curve by increasing their natural gas capacity, constructing and integrating more
renewable energy generation facilities, and retiring coal power
plants.201
This ongoing trend is dynamically changing the electricity sector’s generation portfolio, and benefiting the environment and public welfare by reducing carbon dioxide emissions. This movement
can be primarily attributed to two factors: reduced costs in investing in renewable energy systems, like solar and wind, and low natural gas prices.202 Thus far, looking at the sector’s ongoing progress

200. See generally Inst. for Elec. Innovation, Thought Leaders Speak Out: Key Trends
Driving Change in the Electric Power Industry, EDISON FOUNDATION (Dec. 2015),
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iei/Documents/IEI_KeyTrendsDrivingChange_FINAL.pdf.
201. See Gavin Bade, Will the Clean Power Plan Actually Change Anything in the
Power Sector?, UTILITYDIVE (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/will-the-cleanpower-plan-actually-change-anything-in-the-power-sector/403639/.
202. See Michael Grunwald, Hidden in Obama’s New Climate Plan, A Whack at Red
States, POLITICO (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/08/hidden-inobamas-new-climate-plan-a-whack-at-red-states-000188; see also Robert Walton, EEI: Utilities Moving from Coal, Toward Gas & Renewables Regardless of CPP Stay, UTILITYDIVE (Feb.

328

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 53

with these trends in mind, utilities have made investments in natural gas and renewable energy generating systems that, “have cut
carbon dioxide emissions 15-percent below 2005 levels” already.203
With natural gas prices as low as they are, utilities and power companies are encouraged to invest in natural gas fired electricity generation and construct more natural gas pipeline infrastructure.204
Since both the Production Tax Credit and the Investment Tax
Credit have been extended through 2021 by Congress, wind and
solar development are continuing to boom.205 The wind industry is
thriving not only because of the Production Tax Credit, but also
because wind’s installation costs have decreased by nearly 66 percent since 2009.206
In addition, and as previously mentioned, twenty-nine states
already have and are implementing renewable portfolio standard
programs which are further incentivizing renewable energy development and integration.207 Along with these standards and goals,
states have also developed initiatives with energy efficiency programs that aim at reducing energy consumption, further reducing
potential carbon dioxide emissions.208 For example, in the Pacific
Northwest region, the Northwest Power and Conservation Council

12, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/eei-utilities-moving-from-coal-toward-gas-renewables-regardless-of-cpp/413822/.
203. EEI to Wall Street: The Promise of Tomorrow, EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE (Feb.
10,
2016),
http://www.eei.org/resourcesandmedia/newsroom/Pages/Press%20Releases/EEI%20to%20Wall%20Street%20The%20Promise%20of%20Tomorrow.aspx
(statement made by Tom Kuhn).
204. See Robert Walton, Why the Supreme Court Stay on The Clean Power Plan ‘Means
Nothing’ for Efficiency, UTILITYDIVE (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/whythe-supreme-court-stay-on-the-clean-power-plan-means-nothing-for-effi/414000/.
205. See Herman K. Trabish, Powered by PTC, Wind Energy Expected to Keep Booming Despite Clean Power Plan Stay, UTILITYDIVE (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/powered-by-ptc-wind-energy-expected-to-keep-booming-despite-cleanpower-pl/413443/ (demand for cheap wind may be so great that utilities build out enough to
meet CPP targets regardless of stay).
206. See Officials Highlight Need for Stable Policy to Continue Growing Wind Energy,
AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.awea.org/MediaCenter/pressrelease.aspx?ItemNumber=7787.
207.

See generally DSIRE & U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, supra note 180.

208.

See Walton, supra note 204.
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has estimated that the region could meet twenty years’ worth of
demand growth through energy-efficient measures.209 In fact, the
Pacific Northwest’s regional energy load has only grown by an average of 0.4 percent annually due to investments in energy efficiency.210 Thus, in a business as usual situation, as we currently
have now with the stay on the Plan, it is apparent that numerous
states have taken the initiative to transform their energy generation portfolios and reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the electricity sector. However, even with this progress there are certain
states that could use some work or a push through guidance or regulation to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.211 Therefore, the EPA
should consider other options, like regional market-based emission
cap programs, that would be more effective for these stubborn
high-emitting states.
The EPA should take an approach that would primarily rely
on the market and the states themselves, while retaining some
oversight, to reduce carbon dioxide emissions while transforming
the electricity sector in ways the states see fit. This could be done
by incorporating the ideals and lessons learned from the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program, a cap and trade program initiated by ten states in 2009, and transforming it into a
regional program throughout the country.212 Similar to the RGGI

209. See Carol Winkel, Northwest Power Plan Supports Growth While Preserving Natural Resources: Improved energy efficiency, demand response, and natural gas generation are
primary means to ensuring a reliable and economical power supply, NW. POWER AND
CONSERVATION COUNCIL (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.nwcouncil.org/news/blog/7th-pp-approved/?mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRogua3Kd%2B%2FhmjTEU5z17OwpUKSylMI%2F0ER3fOvrPUfGjI4FS8ZhMq%2BTFAwTG5toziV8R7DNLM1wy8YQWhPh;
see also Seventh Power Plan, NW. POWER AND CONSERVATION COUNCIL, (Feb. 25, 2016),
http://www.nwcouncil.org/energy/powerplan/7/plan/.
210.

Winkel, supra note 209.

211. See generally Application by 29 States & State Agencies for Immediate Stay of
Final Agency Acion During Pendency of Petitions for Review, West Virginia et al. v. EPA, No.
16- (U.S. Jan. 26, 2016) (generally, the states that are challenging the rule are typically higher
emitting states, like West Virginia, Texas, and Arkansas).
212. See generally PAUL J. HIBBARD, SUSAN F. TIERNEY, ANDREA M. OKIE, PAVEL G.
DARLING, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE ON TEN
NORTHEAST AND MID-ATLANTIC STATES, ANALYSIS GROUP (Nov. 15, 2011), https://lmscontent.embanet.com/VLS/ENV5226/Module6/EconomicImpactRGGIReport.pdf.
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program set up, the EPA could establish regional programs
throughout the country with set carbon dioxide emission caps for
every region. This way states could dynamically work together to
achieve these emission caps more efficiently by pooling sources together and looking at emissions with a regional perspective.
Within each designated regional program area, the EPA could
evaluate the current and projected carbon dioxide emission levels
for the region, which the EPA has already done on a state by state
level for the Clean Power Plan, and establish set emission caps
that the states have to be within by a final deadline, which the EPA
can set up. Then, after the EPA evaluates whether it would be
more efficient to set up interim deadlines of every two or three
years, the states could evaluate their current electricity-generating
facilities and emission levels so that they could then buy carbon
dioxide emission allowances.213
This market-based system, modeled after the RGGI program,
is similar to the already successful market-based system established by the EPA for nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide emissions,
except that allowances would be purchased at a market-set price.214
Putting a set cost on the emissions allowances is beneficial particularly in electricity markets because these costs can easily be
rolled into the competitive wholesale markets for electricity or rate
cases set by utilities.215 These costs help reflect the costs of emitting
carbon dioxide, while sending signals to market participants
which, over time, could further encourage industries and power
companies to invest in efficiency initiatives, renewable energy resources, or change operations to overall reduce carbon dioxide
emissions.216
The unique concept about the RGGI program, in comparison
to other market-based schemes, is that the money spent by power
generators to buy allowances, to comply with their emissions, gets
funneled back to their respective state governments where the

213. See id. at 9 (at the end of interim deadlines, or generally deadlines set up within
the program, the electric generating facilities must have obtained allowances equal to its carbon dioxide emissions).
214.

See id.

215.

See id. at 10.

216.

See id.
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state is free to spend the funds as it pleases.217 Most of the states
in the original RGGI program typically invested half of their funds
into energy efficiency programs, which reduced energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions while creating numerous jobs
throughout the region.218 This is a win-win scenario for the states
since they are allowed to use these funds in various programs that
may not involve the electricity sector.219 For example, within the
first three years of the RGGI’s implementation, the RGGI produced
an approximate economic benefit of $1.6 billion, increased job years
by approximate 16,000, and reduced payments to out of region providers of fossil fuels by a little over $765 million.220 Although the
RGGI program had some minor issues due to the set cap level’s
inadequacy, the EPA could prevent these issues, as well as others,
by creating a program or regional group that consistently monitors
emissions and emission reduction progress to assess whether caps
need to be changed if regions are more effective than others.221
The main benefits of the EPA implementing a regional market
based emissions cap program for carbon dioxide emissions, like the
RGGI program, is that it has already been done and proven successful, given some minor fixes and changes, and it provides the
states with compensational benefits for their efforts in mitigating
carbon dioxide emissions and transforming their energy generation portfolios.222 West Virginia is a good example of a state that

217.

See id.

218.

See HIBBARD ET. AL., supra note 212, at 33–37; see also LUCAS BIFERA, CENTER
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI), (Dec.
2013), http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/rggi-brief-12-18-13-updated.pdf.
FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS,

219. For example, some states invested funds into educational programs and into the
state government itself to reduce deficits or create jobs. See HIBBARD ET. AL., supra note 212,
at 20.
220.

See id. at 36.

221. See Mark Febrizio, RGGI: A Faulty Model for “Successful” Cap-and-Trade,
INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY RESOURCE (Dec. 15, 2015), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/rggi-a-faulty-model-for-successful-cap-and-trade/.
222.

See HIBBARD ET. AL., supra note 212, at 36, 43–48.
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needs this kind of help in reducing emissions and diversifying its
energy portfolio.
West Virginia’s net electricity generation in 2015 was comprised of coal fired power plants, about 94 percent specifically, with
renewable energy resources contributing about 3.7 percent.223 With
the state producing more electricity than it consumes, exporting
about three-fourths of the coal it mines to other states,224 and coal
reliance declining generally throughout the country, West Virginia
has the potential to drastically transform its electricity sector to
become more diverse. With a regional carbon emission cap market
scheme in place, all of those coal fired power plant generators
would have to buy allowances for every short ton of emissions they
emit, which would create extra costs that would roll into consumer
electricity rates. These higher rates for coal powered electricity
would instigate customers and market participants to buy less of
these electricity services, which would then cause a reduction in
electricity production by coal-fired power plants.225 Meanwhile, the
funds generated from the purchase of emission allowances would
go to the state where the state could take and divvy up the funds
to invest in natural gas powered electricity development, energy
efficiency measures, renewable energy resources, and any other areas of investment that the state deems necessary.
Over time, as the state fluctuates from its original heavy reliance on coal and coal-fired power plants to diversifying its electricity generation resources through its compliance with the regional
cap market scheme, the state will aid in the overall effort to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions while being compensating for its efforts.
Especially because the cap periodically lowers to further reduce
overall regional carbon dioxide emissions, this would further instigate the state to use the funds, generated by the emission allowance proceeds, for investments in energy measures that would reduce carbon dioxide emissions while creating jobs and boosting the
state’s economy. Therefore, although West Virginia would need to
change its electricity generation resource portfolio, if it does so
wisely by using the state funds generated through the regional

223. West Virginia State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, (last updated July 21, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.cfm?sid=WV.
224.

See id.

225.

See HIBBARD ET. AL., supra note 212, at 33–35.
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market based emissions cap program, the state would produce
enough electricity to meet its consumers’ and citizens’ needs and
successfully reduce carbon dioxide emissions.
In the end, the EPA is within its regulatory bounds in promulgating carbon dioxide emission reduction goals within the Clean
Power plan, but given that the Plan is expansive and extremely
significant, which is further highlighted by the Supreme Court’s
unusual move in staying the Plan’s promulgation,226 the Court may
disagree with the EPA’s vast endeavor of regulating carbon dioxide
emissions in the Plan and invalidate it. If this were to happen, the
EPA should utilize all of its research and data on state specific
emission goals and start developing a rule that would create regional market based programs that aim at encouraging the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions while boosting state economies.
This approach would essentially provide a win-win for the states
and the EPA while also benefiting the environment by mitigating
future climate change impacts. As stated by an EPA representative, after the Supreme Court issued its stay on the Plan, “you can’t
stay climate change and you can’t stay climate action.”227 Therefore, one way or another, the EPA will find a way to initiate and
pursue progressive action in the face of climate change and lead
this country towards a healthier and brighter future.
VI. CONCLUSION
This country can no longer deny the consequences of its actions. It cannot continue emitting harsh pollutants into the air just
because the fuel supplies are cheap and come from long-utilized
sources. The United States has come so far in environmental regulation, protecting human health, and conserving natural resources. It cannot take a step backward now.
Some states may want to maintain the status quo, but the longevity of that option is limited. Human actions have caused too

226. See generally Emily Holden, Elizabeth Harball, & Ellen M. Gilmer, SCOTUS
halts Clean Power Plan, stuns states planning carbon cuts, E&E PUBLISHING (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060032137.
227.

See id. (statement from Melissa Harrison, EPA Press Secretary).
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many environmental disasters to stay on that path for long. Although the states would like the ultimate freedom to choose what
electricity-generating plants they use, they must consider their citizens’ health and welfare at the same time.
Despite the desire to operate efficient and cheap power plants,
those harmful facilities are actually holding the states back from
meeting their responsibilities. Climate change poses a “monumental threat” to the prosperity of the greatest number for the longest
time.228 By working together to reduce carbon dioxide emissions
and mitigate climate change, the states and the EPA can best serve
the people. To ensure the greatest good for future generations, society must take responsibility for its actions—starting now.

228. Respondent EPA’s Opposition to Motions to Stay Final Rule at 1, West Virgina.
v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 3, 2015) (noting that climate change poses a “monumental
threat to Americans’ health and welfare by causing [enduring] changes in [the] climate, resulting in an array of severe negative effects, including drought, disease, increasing weather
events, and rising sea levels”); see also PINCHOT, supra note 1.

